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Abstract
In spite of the general consensus concerning the effectiveness of regional
organizations in enabling democracy consolidation, there remain concerns about
single international organizations facilitating democracy. Those who doubt the
effectiveness of a single international organization's intervention believe that it is a
burden due to the cost and expertise that is required. This paper tests the usefulness of
a joint operation between regional and world organizations compared to a single
regional and a single world organization. Three case studies, on Peru (1992),
Guatemala (1993), and Haiti (1991), suggest that the OASNN joint mission in Haiti
increased the level of democracy the most according to the Polity score.

I.

Introduction

It is evident from the works by scholars such as Pevehouse and Mansfield
that regional organizations are relatively more effective than world organizations in
implementing and consolidating democracy. However, while there are thorough
studies on regional and world organizations, in-depth research on joint international
organization practice is lacking. On January 30, 1995, Resolution 975 favoring
positive outcomes in Haiti was agreed to by the UN Security Council. The Resolution
described the joint venture of the OAS and the UN in their International Civil Mission
to Haiti OASAJN (MICIVIH) as valuable and acknowledged its importance in
developing a favorable environment in Haiti. The UN Secretary General emphasized
to "bear in mind the expertise and potential of the OAS, consult with the Secretary
Genera1 of the OAS regarding other appropriate measures which might be taken by
both organizations consistent with this resolution."' The recent joint forum by the UN
and the OAS held in Mexico in October 2010 supports this trend in recognizing the
importance of cooperation between these international organizations.
Cooperation between the organizations is increasingly desired as the issues
have become complicated and require mixed sets of expertise and skills. For
example, it is now evident that democracy consolidation cannot be solved through
political intervention alone but that societal and cultural change is also required. This
raises the cost and expertise required by the international organizations to deal with

'

Berenson, William M. 1996. Joint Venture for the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti: The
Organization of American States and United Nations Experience: 1991- 1995. OAS.org.
http://www.oas.org/legal/english/DUKEREV.doc (accessed November 21, 2010). 27

the issue. The rising costs and requirements for more complex knowledge to solve this
issue has become a burden to some international organizations that do not have the
necessary experience or are not funded well. Therefore, it is now important to seek
cooperation between different types of international organizations to secure more
effective democracy consolidation.
For this reason, this study discusses the effectiveness of joint operations by
international organizations. It argues that when regional organizations and world
organizations cooperate, there is a greater possibility to increase the level of
democracy in a country than when an international organization works alone. This
paper focuses on the joint operation between regional organizations and world
organizations and its effectiveness in democracy consolidation, especially in Latin
America. The paper is structured in seven parts. First, the literature review examines
scholars' views of international organizations and their capability in democracy
consolidation. Then, I define democracy in this paper. Third, three independent
variables are explained. After defining regional organizations, world organizations,
and the joint operation between the two, I move on to three case studies: Peru (1992),
Guatemala (1993), and Haiti (1991). In the fifth part, I discuss the effectiveness of the
joint form of international organizations between the UN and the OAS, before
concluding. I am expecting to earn support for the argument that joint operations can
be an effective tool in promoting democracy consolidation.

11.

Literature Review

Many efforts to discover a reason for the consolidation of democracy range
from the internal and external political environment, multilateral institutions, to
individuals. However, most widely studied is the effect of economic development on
democracy consolidation. Like Lipset and ~ r i s t o l ethere
~ , are groups of scholars who
argue that the increase in economic development has a positive impact on democracy.
There are also scholars such as ~ a r r o who
, ~ claim that when a country reaches a
certain level of economic development, its influence on democracy terminates.
However, still other scholars, such as

eve house,^

argue that regional

organizations are effective in aiding democratic consolidation. This is because such
organizations can influence the behavior of major domestic actors in regime change
such as military elites and business actors, especially due to their uncertainty about
regime change. These actors believe that the new regime can defend their interests
and therefore they support the regime change. Regional organizations are capable of
protecting an already existing regime, yet at the same time they are most prone to act
against it. Also, "homogenous" organizations are more capable of pressuring nondemocratic or democracy consolidating countries to catalyze the process because
democratic countries tend to have higher expectations in accepting a member. In
addition, Pevehouse suggests that if a country does not succeed in democracy

Barro, Robert J.. 1999. Determinants of Democracy. The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 107, No.
6, Part 2. S182
Barro, 158-9.
Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization.
Cambridge University Press: United Kingdom

'

consolidation, then there is a chance of the country collapsing. Therefore, the process
relates to a country's "surviva~."~
pevehouse6 argues that regional organizations need to be most examined.
This is because Pevehouse believes that regional organizations are the most often
found organizations in the international system and that this allows researchers to find
unique results. He also earns support from Whitehead's comment that a regional
organization is more capable in defining clear results. Therefore, Pevehouse
especially tests the effectiveness of domestic actors joining regional organizations.
This idea is also supported by the study from Mansfield and Pevehouse, who believe
that democratic consolidation accelerates when a country becomes a member of an
international organization. As they explain, a state that is under democratization tends
to join international ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o nBy
s . ~obtaining membership in an international
organization, a state is able to gain information about democracy and earn prestige in
international society.
It is widely believed in international organizations theory that membership in
international organizations can bring democracy consolidation. This is because most
scholars, including

eveh house,' argue that a "homogenous" organization, an

international organization that is constituted with highly democratic states, are more
likely to pressure non-democratic states or states in the transition to democracy.
Although democracy in Latin America has improved in the last few decades,
democracy is still fragile in some parts of Latin American countries. Thus, it is

Pevehouse, Democracy from Above, 29

' Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and
Democratization. International Organization Vol. 56 No. 3 (Summer):520
Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 2006. Democratization and International Organizations.
International Organization Vol. 60 No. I (Winter): 145
Pevehouse, Democracy from Above 47

'

difficult to expect for Latin American regional organizations to consolidate
democracy to the level that the world organizations might anticipate.
In addition, Levitsky and way9 argue that more interactions with democratic
countries beyond the region, especially with the West, encourage a state to
democratize. Regional organizations are more prone to have higher concentrations of
members and power to address an issue when they have similar interests. However,
when an international organization lacks democratically mature states, it is difficult
for the democratizing states to earn information or prestige. On the other hand, world
organizations such as the United Nations have sometimes had difficulty in
implementing activities because the member states have various interests.
Nevertheless, world organizations can sometimes be more effective institutions in
actively engaging in democratization and elevating the level of democracy because
they are more likely to have a larger number of democratized countries. In order to
support this argument, casc studies will follow.
In addition, this study tries to further the scope of international organizations'
effects from regional organizations to world organizations. This is because many
studies in evaluating the effect of international organizations in Latin America are
highly focused on regional organizations. A concentration on regional organizations
can be understood in the context of the positive theoretical evaluation outlined above:
the regional organizations function more easily as a tool to democratize a country. If
this argument proves to have support, then joint operations by international
organizations with similar objectives could be encouraged so as to further consolidate
democracy in the region.
9

Levitsky, Steven, Lucan A. Way. 2005. International Linkage and Democratization. Journal of
Democracy 16.3: 20-34

Therefore, this study also tries to support the budding cooperation between
the OAS, whose main objective is to promote democracy in the Latin American
region, and the UN, a world organization that commits its efforts to better living
conditions, which relates to democracy. In the next part, I will discuss how different
scholars define democracy.

111.

Measuring Democracy

This study analyzes how different types of international organizations affect
the level of democracy in each case. The level of democracy, therefore, is the
dependent variable. In this study, 1use Huntington's definition of democracy; he
describes democracy as the system in which the "most powerful collective decision
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates
freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to
vote."1•‹ Democratization is a "transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes
that occur within a specified period of time.""
Most countries in Latin America, except for Cuba (which received -7 on the
2007 Polity Score) and Venezuela (which dropped drastically from 5 in 2007 to -4 in
200912), are considered fairly democratic. According to the Polity scale, the
democracy level in the region increased from 0.30 (1981), to 2.74 (1985), to 6.96
(2001) showing general growth. The "region mean state fragility index score" by the
Center for Systemic Peace shows it dropped from approximately 10 in 1995 to 6.65 in
2009.13 Also, research by the Polity IV Project records Latin America's fragility index
of 2009 as very stable in most of the countries, except for Ecuador, Colombia and
l o Huntington, Samuel P.. 1991. The Third Wave: democratization in the late twentieth century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 7
I ' Huntington, 15
12
Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. 2009. Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State
Fragility. Center for Systemic Peace
I' Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. 2009. Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State
Fragility. Center for Systemic Peace. http:Nwww.systemicpeace.org/CTfig19.htm(accessed October 18,
20 1 0)
The fragility index scores from 25 to 0 dividing levels of fragility into six indexes. Little or no fragility
scores from 0 to 3, low is from 4 to 7, moderate scores from 8 to I I , serious is from 12 to 15, high
ranges between 16 and 19, and extreme is from 20 to 25.

Mexico in 2009 for drug t r a f f i ~ k i n ~most
; ' ~ countries scored moderate, low, little or
no sudden political or violent incidents. However, it is dubious to conclude that the
region is under democratization or consolidation of democracy by only looking at this
result alone because this score is focused on states' stability. For this reason, an
examination of democratic consolidation should not only include the political system
but also the level of infrastructure, freedom, and human rights.
As the democracy level is the dependent variable of this study, I will use the
Polity IV ~roject'' and political and civil rights indexes from Freedom ~ o u s e to
'~
measure the democracy level of countries in the region. The Polity score considers
that autocracy and democracy can exist simultaneously and this uniqueness allows us
to measure the level of democracy more easily of those countries in a transition period.
The Polity Score varies from -10 to 10 and divides these numbers into three
regime types. From -10 to -6 is categorized as authoritarian, -5 to 5 as anocracies, and
6 to 10 as democracies. In addition, numeric values are considered because this study

tries to analyze different democratic levels. However, relying only on the Polity Score
has limitations because the Polity Score highly focuses on political system change. It
has limitations in clearly distinguishing since most Latk American countries are in
the range of the democracy index in the 2007 Polity score. Also, the reason for relying
on the Polity score is that recent international organizations not only focused on
political infrastructure as one of the requirements for democracy but also included the
domestic political environment, such as the level of respect for human rights, as one
Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. 5-6
Polity I V Project. 2010. Polity IV Project: political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2008.
Political Instability Task Force(P1TF). http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed May
27, 2010)
I6
Freedom House. 2008. Washington D.C.. Freedom House. httn:llwww.freedomhouse.ord
template.cfm?pa~e=35I &ana ~aee=342&year=2008(accessed May 27,2010)
l4
l5

of the important conditions for democracy. Therefore, I will also compare the study
with the Freedom House index.
Another reason for selecting this method is because the Freedom House
provides an index from the early 1970s, which matches the beginning phase of the
third wave in Latin America. Furthermore, the Freedom House index measures
democracy with two separate indices, political rights and civil liberties; the former
includes rights such as electoral rights and the latter reviews other rights given to
people in a country.
The Freedom House index follows three divisions: "free", "partly free", and
"not free". Freedom House categorizes full democracy using index scores one (1) and
two (2) and labels it as "free"; from levels three (3) to five (5) a country is labeled
"partly free"; and levels six (6) and seven (7) as "not free". This paper will use these
numeric scores (from one to seven) to measure democracy. The reason for using the
one to seven indicators in measuring democracy is that it allows more variance in
testing the hypothesis. According to the Freedom House model, one (I) is the most
democratic, the most "free" borrowing the Freedom House term, and seven (7) is the
most authoritarian, the most "not free" democratic regime also using the Freedom
House terminology.'7
It is expected that measuring both the Polity score and the Freedom House
score will allow us to better assess the level of democracy in Latin America.

17

Freedom House. 2008. Washington D.C.. Freedom House. httn://www.freedomhouse.ord
temvlate.cfm?~age=35
I&ana va~e=342&vear=2008(accessed May 27,2010)

IV.

Independent Variables

This paper examines the effects of different types of international
organizations and whether they can contribute to democracy consolidation, especially
in the Latin American region. Accordingly, the independent variables are a
combination of an intervention by a single international organization and a joint
international organizations operation. To examine the efficiency of these international
organizations in democracy consolidation, I will study three types of international
organizations: world organizations, regional organizations, and joint organizations.
International organizations are described by Pevehouse as "formal
institutional bodies with nation-states as decision-making

member^."'^

The definition

of an international organization which Marshall, Marshall, and Young provide is more
detailed than other descriptions; they are "autonomous international governmental.. .
organizations of a non-profit nature. Multinational enterprises are therefore excluded.
All such bodies have members in at least 3 countries and do not have their activities
or decision-making structured in favour of any particular country."19
Mansfield and Pevehouse put emphasis on its functions, unlike other
definitions that focus on membership and structure. They define it as "associations
established by governments or their representatives that are sufficiently
institutionalized to require regular meetings, rules governing decision making, a

Pevehouse Jon C.. With a little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the
Consolidation of Democracy. American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46 No. 3: 61 1
I y Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 1999. Membership in
Conventional International Organizations 1952 - 1997. Center for Systemic Peace. 3
l8

permanent staff, and a headquarters."20
Along with the definition for international organizations, I will follow
Marshall, Marshall, and ~ o u n ~ ' description
s~'
from the "Membership in
Conventional International Organizations 1952 - 1997" to measure regional
organizations. They define regional organizations while categorizing them as
"intercontinental membership organizations"22 as "includ[ing] all international nonprofit organizations.. . whose membership and preoccupations exceed that of a
particular continental region, although not to a degree justifying its inclusion in the
previous type."23 Among the regional organizations in the Latin American region, I
will use the intervention by the Organization of American States (OAS) on the self coup caused by President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in the early 1990s and in the early
2000s.
Next, I will use the definition from the same source for world organizations.
They describe the world organizations, or the universal membership organizations, as
including "all non-profit international organizations... that have a widespread,
geographically-balanced membership, management and policy-control. Although this
concept of a 'universal' membership organization is much discussed, no generally
accepted rule for distinguishing such bodies has been formulated. The rule applied
here is that there should be members in at least 60 countries, or else in more than 30
countries provided that the distribution between continents is 'well-ba~anced."'~~
Accordingly, the United Nations will be used as a case study for the world

'"Mansfield, and Pevehouse. 138

21

Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young.
Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 3
2 h a r s h a l l , Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 3
24
Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 4
22

organizations since it is one of the largest and one of the most well functioning world
organizations. As for the case study, the autogolpe by President Jorge Serrano in 1993
will be studied. In the case of Guatemala, the UN interference was not caused by the
action of President Serrano but by Guatemala's long lasting domestic instability.
However, this case study was selected because the initial concern for intervention,
human rights and restoring democracy, was similar to the other case studies.
Lastly, the collective action form of these two types of organizations will be
defined as joint organizations. The organizations referred to in this part of the paper
are the OAS and the UN. The study will focus on the chain of missions exercised in
Haiti from 1991 through 1995.
These three case studies were selected because the first two cases, Peru (1992)
and Guatemala (1993), concerned domestic insecurity caused by the self - coup by
the president and both the OAS and the UN reacted to these issues. Although the case
study of Haiti (1991) is not caused by an autogolpe, it was selected because it was
caused by a coup d'etat and it is one of the first joint missions that was adopted in
Latin America.
Before I move on to the case studies, I will discuss three types of
international organizations in order to understand their characteristics in more detail.

V.

International Organizations

A lot of studies on the effects of international organizations on democracy
consolidation focus on states' membership in international organizations rather than
how these institutions function to consolidate democracy. Although there may be a
basic set protocol within each institution regarding how to deal with democracy
backtracking issues, each instance varies greatly and it is difficult to theorize the issue.
In this section I will describe the strengths and weaknesses of joining each type of
international organizations. Former United Nations Secretary - General Boutros
i ~ recognized
~
this issue and was concerned that the United
Boutros - ~ h a l also
Nations democracy consolidation efforts should not be determined with one sweeping
policy.
Therefore I will start by explaining the functions of the international
organizations compared to regional organizations and world organizations to discover
which type of international organizations have superior influence in consolidating
democracy in the Latin American region. Thus, I will begin with a description of the
general characteristics of the international organizations and move on to the
distinctive features of the regional organizations and the world organizations. As the
joint international organizations operation is a combination of the previous two types
of international organizations, it will not be substantially discussed. Followed by the
characteristics, I will move on to functional practices that these international
organizations perform to consolidate democracy.

''

Adams, Francis. 2003. Deepening Democracy: Global Governance and Political Reform in Latin
America. Westport: Praeger Publishers

As explained earlier, Mansfield and

eveh house^^ researched what causes

states to participate in each type of international organization. The distinctive nature
of international organizations varies according to the requirements that the states may
need to meet to join them. Some of them vary from requiring no changes in order to
become a member in organizations like the United Nations, to grand economic and
political changes needed for membership in organizations such as the European Union.
Both regional and world organizations fall under "political organizations"27 because,
generally, these types of organizations do not have particular aims that are desired
from the member countries.28
Unfortunately, differentiating regional and world organizations is difficult
when these both fall under the same category. Also, a clear distinction between both
organizations is difficult when scholars ambiguously define international
organizations. They share characteristics of international organizations. For example,
although Pevehouse focuses on the regional organizations in the book Democracy

from Above, it is difficult to understand the separation between the two organizations.
That having been said, regional and world organizations may show similar
bshavior when they require the member states to maintain their status as democratic
states or consolidate their democracy levels. The international organizations, both
regional and world, can urge the member state that is backtracking from its process to
consolidate democracy through political (diplomatic) and economic pressure. Doing
so can have positive effects, especially on newly recognized democracies and those
that are in the positive process of consolidation. Pressuring the states that fail to

*'

Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. Democratization and the Varieties of International
Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 52.269-294
27 Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008.52.274
28 Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 272-4

consolidate democracy can differentiate pressuring states from those of failing ones
and can elevate one's standing in international organizations.29
Also, the pressure by the democratic countries to backtracking countries not
only drives member countries from an international organization's dedication to
proliferate democracy, but also widens their trade and political partners. This is
because of the general understanding that democracy has positive political and
economic effects and these countries are highly favorable to economic relationships in
both private and public sectors with international partners.30These attributes of
international organizations catalyze the member states in international organizations
to propagate democracy both within the international organizations and outside as
well.
Moreover, another important factor is that states join certain international
organizations to show their commitment to introduce or strengthen democracy
domestically. Showing a commitment though joining international organizations can
give the impression to domestic actors that the government has the strong will to
consolidate democracy. This intention can be seen through domestic reforms of
government systems, electoral processes, and human rights.3' The cost of changing
the domestic rules are high and sometimes the government has to deal with the
domestic elites in contrary positions, especially of those in business and the military.32
Therefore, it is generally thought that the pressure democratizing states or
states that are under a process of consolidating democracy comes from a membership
requirement that international organizations ask for when joining them. This is
29

Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? 523

'"Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? 523
j'

32

Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above
Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above

because after meeting the condition, especially those states which have a high
commitment to consolidate democracy or democratization do not attempt to go
against the process.
However, the most distinctive difference between the regional and world
organizations is how much the members states' voice can influence the organization.
As the regional organizations tend to have fewer members due to their geographical
limits, small or less powerful countries have a higher chance to be opinionated.
Pevehouse also writes that the "forum provides states of all sizes with a low-cost
'voice' opportunity."33
Furthermore, these international organizations have a systematic similarity in
helping countries to consolidate democracy. Especially in this part of the paper, I
focus on two international organizations, the OAS and the UN, because the case
studies undertaken later focus on these two organizations. It is interesting that
democracy promotion in both the UN and the OAS stem from human rights protection.
It is not surprising that the UN is concerned about human rights; however, it is odd to
see the OAS initiatives for protecting human rights in the region. This is because
recently the OAS is widely understood as a democracy proliferating organization in
the region than protecting human rights; still, the organization began to concentrate on
democracy consolidation after 1985 at the General Assembly Meeting in ~ a r t a ~ e n a ~ ~
where "delegates to this session amended the preamble of the OAS charter [Article 2
of the Chapter I] to state that 'representative democracy is an indispensable condition
for the stability, peace and development of the region."'35

'' Pevehouse Jon C . 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In523
34

"

Adams,. 88
Adams. 88

Nonetheless, these organizations initiated democracy promotion from human
rights concerns. They also share similar functional mechanisms. Three functional
similarities can be found between the OAS and the UN: electoral support, help for
local governments to build institutional systems, and sharing i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~
The highest objective of supporting electoral systems is to encourage
countries to have periodic and fair elections. This assistance can range from building
institutional infrastructure to generating "civil registries"37 through monitoring and
education. For example, the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) is organized under
the Department of Political Affairs in the UN to assist states that are in need of
planning clean and fair elections.38The second objective is to help central and local
governments build basic institutional systems to strengthen the local governments and
decentralize from the central governments.39 Decentralization from the central
governments is also associated with consolidating democracy because it can reduce
the ability of a dominant leader monopolizing the country as autocratic governments
do. Compared to the central government, local governments lack knowledge of
maintaining resources and finance. More importantly, these organizations help local
governments to strengthen legislative systems by offering expertise in endorsing
legislation and developing local policies.40 Lastly, the organizations facilitate as an
information sharing site for transparent government. However, while the UN collects
information on government functions and its ability to support the domestic system,

"

''
"

40

Adams, 49,97
Adams, 97
Adams, 49.97
Adams, 52,98
Adams, 52,98

the OAS focuses its data collection efforts on democracy proliferation.4'
In the next part of the paper I will discuss three case studies in which,
respectively, the OAS, UN, and a joint UNIOAS mission intervened in Latin
American countries.

4'

Adams, 54,99

18

VI.

Case Studies

A. The OAS: Peru in 1992

I begin the case studies of the two organizations with the role of the OAS in
Peru during the Fujimori government from 1990 to 2000. The initial phase of
democratization was driven in the late 1970s by the military. This is because the
military regime was incapable of resolving the economic crisis and the divided
military understandings. Additional processes such as elections to return the country
to civilian rule were taken between 1977 and 1980, with financial relief from foreign
countries to some of the parties in ~ e r u By
. ~the
~ 1980s, Peru had democratized.

In 1990 Alberto Fujimori was elected. He became a beloved figure in the
country and America for his efforts in dealing with the Shining Path and in settling the
economic crisis even as he was also suspect because of his political attitude toward
human rights.43 TWOyears after the election, on April 5 1992, President Fujimori
announced Plan Verde with military assistance. This plan resulted in limiting
Congress, banning the constitution, dismissing the judiciary, and suspending the
outline from Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori's self - coup
media. Plan Verde was ~II
advisor, which gave emergency authority to the president when necessary.44
This action taken by Fujimori was especially welcomed by military and

42

Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 2006. Intervention without Intervening? The OAS Defense and
Promotion of Democracy in the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan.45-9
41
Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 49
44 Cameron, Maxwell A,. 1998. Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala, and Russia. Journal ofDemocmcy.
Johns Hopkins University Press. 126

business actors who had lost faith in democracy after the economy had worsened4'.
Two estimations about Fujimori's self - coup can be discussed. One is that Fujimori
had concerns over the economic crisis in Peru and these worries caused him to control
the legislative system. Another analysis, which is more believed by scholars, is that he
was obsessed with maintaining the

Fujimori's behavior was condemned

by many countries such as the United States. However, while controversial, elections
that took place in 1995 were assessed by scholars such as ~ e v i t s kand
~ Arceneaux
~
and pion-~erlin~'
as Fujimori's regime going back to democracy.
To the OAS, Peru was one of the first interventions for democratization in the
early 1990s.~' Soon after the self - coup, the Permanent Council issued Resolution
579, stating that Fujimori had violated Resolution 1080, and decided to hold an
immediate ad hoc meeting. The meeting held in November agreed to send a "high level fact finding mission."50 They also agreed to elect a group - called the
Democratic Constitutional Congress - and observe them write a new Constitution that
would serve until the new presidential election of 1995.''
Although the OAS made progress on gaining consent from Fujimori to hold a
legislative election in 1995, the institution was also marked by its lack of consensus
and its feeble monitoring mission. Members such as the United States on the one hand
and Mexico - Brazil on the other had the most conflicting suggestions. Countries had

45

Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 50
Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 49
47 Levitsky, Steven. 1999. Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru. Journal of Democracy. Johns
Hopkins University Press. 78
4R Arceneaux, Craig L. and David Pion-Berlin. 2007. Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS
Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America. Latin American Polirics & Sociery, Vol. 49. No.
2. 16
4' Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 45-6
so Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 5 1
5 1 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 5 1
46

different perspectives on the strength of the reaction towards the self - coup.S2Further,
uncertainty about the mission's effectiveness had risen when the observer missions to
two 1995 elections were unsuccessful. The elections were questioned in their
transparency. In one of the elections, the national election, almost 6,000 ballots
perished. Nearly forty percent of the ballots were abrogated during the legislative
ele~tion.'~
Failings of the monitoring body were critical because they were present at
the country with a visit arranged by President Fujimori himself.
Unlike what the OAS expected, the organization was not able to make
significant progress as the public popularity of Fujimori grew. Even if the OAS did
not make much progress with the autogolpe in the early 1990s, it demonstrated
continuous influence in some parts of the electoral system. Enacted by the National
Democratic Institute (NDI), the club created an education system for the observer
group called the " ~ r a n s ~ a r e n c i ain" ~the
~ mid 1990s and this group served for the
2000 presidential election. This observer body constituted of civilians was to support
democratic election: the system was established for transparent vote counting.55
Since the 2000 election, the OAS and particularly the Unit for the Protection
of Democracy, especially pursued by CCsar Gaviria , showed an effort "to expend an
external validation power of the organization" to contribute in a more political
manner.56 The organization passed its constitutional limits in challenging states'
sovereignty and implemented a mission in Peru. This action taken by the OAS
encouraged the institution to move further as a multilateral organization, according to
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Cooper and Legler, but they should not be satisfied with the success in Peru. They
argue that although the organization was blessed in terms of its mission to Peru, the
OAS still has flaws that need to be overcome, such as interfering with sovereignty and
defining democracy within the
As a result, the second OAS intervention in Peru was very successful,
escalating the democracy level from -3 (1992) to 5 (2000), according to the Polity
score. The Polity score reached 1 in 1995 when the OAS made great effort such as
creating domestic observers, although it was not successful failing to meet
transparency of the process, in supporting electoral process. The Freedom House
score also shows a general increase of their democracy level. However, while the
political rights score dropped from 6 (1992) to 3 (2000), the civil rights score only
dropped two levels from 5 (1992) to 3 (2000). The results resemble the OAS
emphasis on the electoral system during the intervention.
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B. United Nations: Guatemala in 1993

A year after President Fujimori's self - coup, Guatemala also experienced an
autogolpe by President Jorge Serrano. He decided to suspend Congress and the
Supreme Court and to ban part of the Constitution. The self - coup in Guatemala is
easily compared to that of Peru's because of its similarity in process.58 However,
unlike the success of President Fujimori, President Serrano had to resign his
presidency after nearly two years of his autocratic regime. One big difference between
President Serrano's action from the autogolpe by President Fujimori is that the self coup in 1993 did not receive severe counter action by international organizations,
although some organizations did voice concerns. This may be because, during that
time, there already had been UN interference in Guatemala to broker peace talks to
end the civil war. The UN took an active role as a mediator to bring about a cease fire
between the Guatemalan government and an opposition group. However, in 1995, the
UN declared a humanitarian mission because it was concerned about the human rights
violations occurring in Guatemala.
Guatemala had long been in unrest due to the civil war with various
opposition forces such as the ladino guerrillas, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP),
the Revolutionary Organization of the Armed People (ORPA), and the Civil Self

-

defense Patrols (PACs). In 1984, when the military had mostly defeated the newly
established National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unit (URNG), the country elected the
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first civilian president and entered into a democratic tran~ition.~~
President Serrano,
after he was elected in January 1991, began to reform the military structure. Many
high military officers were dismissed and charged with crimes. Also, he initiated
direct talks with the opposition forces. Despite President Serrano's achievements, he
was accused of corruption60.President Serrano bought votes using secret funds called
confidenciales, but eventually failed to buy the party's votes to his favor and declared

an autogolpe on May 25, 1993.61However, President Serrano himself had dictatorial
characteristic which encouraged him to declare self -

However, the

Guatemalan government, military, civilians, and the international organizations did
not welcome the self - coup by President Serrano and eventually forced him to resign.
The UN influence in Guatemala began before the autogolpe in 1993. As an
active mediator, the UN helped peace talks to take place in 1990 between the
government and the guerrillas. In 1991, several agreements for a cease - fire were
reached in meetings such as the Mexico Accord in April, but the process was halted
until 1994 because of the self - coup. The Guatemalan government and the opposition
force (URNG) acknowledged each other's commitment to continue the peace
negotiation in January 1 9 9 4 . ~
By~ March, the two parties signed a Comprehensive
Agreement on Human Rights which led to the creation of the United Nations
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Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINuGUA).~~
The MINUGUA was to support
the peace - agreements as the accord added more details later as the agreements were
finalized in December 1 9 9 6 . ~Mandates
~
of the MINUGUA also included monitoring
human rights issues, such as the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples that
occurred because of the ethnic division in Guatemala. This incorporated the education
of indigenous people and encouraged them to actively participate in the representative
system. Also professional training was held to re - enter the rebels into society. In
1996, a peace agreement was finalized by the Guatemalan government and the UNRG.
An agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace included issues such as the cease - fire,
demobilization, and no discrimination of opposition forces when they returned to
society. The MINUGUA's task was to monitor and supervise the demobilization
process, monitor human rights, and provide support for the rebuilding of the judicial
system.66
Consequently, intervention by the UN in Guatemala made the least progress.
Among three case studies, the UN was able to increase the least polity score level
from 3 (1993) to 8 (2000). In addition, result from the UN intervention is not
satisfying because escalation of democracy level appeared only once in 1996, when
the peace agreement was signed, between the years from 1993 to 2000. In addition,
there was no change in the democracy level after 1996. The Freedom House scores
also did not make significant changes. The scores decreased by only one point from 4
(political rights) and 5 (civil rights) in 1993.
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C. Cooperative Form: The OAS-UN mission in Haiti in 1991

This joint venture between the OAS and the UN will be elaborated in more
detail because the purpose of this paper is to emphasize the effectiveness of
international organizations working together. Gibsons concludes that the cooperation
between the OAS and the United Nations was mostly shown in later phase of the
intervention in Haiti. Berenson, on the other hand, argues that the cooperation
between the two organizations was first led by the OAS, immediately after the coup
d9Ctat,and was transferred to the UN in 1 9 9 3 . ~ ~
Immediately after the coup d'Ctat, a lot of the reaction taken by the UN and
the OAS focused on sanctions. The coup d'Ctat, led by General Michel FranFlois on
September 29, 1991, overthrew President Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide, who
was elected seven months before, was exiled to the United States. The OAS held an
ad hoc meeting in response to the coup d'ttat, which violated Resolution 1080.
Decisions made on October 3, 1991 refused to recognize the new government and
ceased all economic relations with Haiti, including humanitarian aid. A few days later,
the UN came up with similar results about the organization's concerns about the
violent activity in Haiti and urged the members to support the OAS to sanction the
new regime. On June 16, 1993 after the UN failed to mediate the issue, the Security
Council announced Resolution 841 to embargo all petrol and arms. Before this
resolution, the UN took a relatively passive attitude toward the new regime, asking

" Berenson, William M. 1996. Joint Venture for the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti: The
Organization of American States and United Nations Experience: 1991-1995. OAS.org.
http:Nwww.oas.orgllegal/english/ DUKEREV.doc (accessed November 21,2010). 20

member states to participate in the sanctions voluntarily.68 However, Resolution 841
was taken into account. This reaction, with the UN acting under the Chapter VII and
VIII,~' was urging cooperation with the regional organization in order to mandatorily
bind states to take action against the new government in Haiti.
With the sanctions continuing to put pressure on Haiti, General Raoul Cedras
was willing to meet President Aristide. From the meeting, the two parties agreed on
the Governors Island Accord and the New York Pact, which included steps that should
be taken until Aristide returned to the country and to his position as the president in
October. The UN and the OAS, separately but on the same day, lifted the embargo to
move toward restoring President Aristide back to his presidential position, although
Cedras still did not allow Aristide back into ~ a i t i . ~ '
In spite of all the other measures that took place, the sanctions against the
military regime were reinstituted. This was because the Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
force failed to continue its plan due to domestic resistance. In May 6, 1994, mostly
driven by the United States, a total sanction towards Haiti was voted on Resolution

917 to increase pressure on the new regime.71 Although the agreement failed, this
meeting called the UN and the OAS to step up together as coordinators of the meeting
in New York to monitor and validate the process. In late September 1994, as the
Multinational Force (MNF) entered and negotiations between General Cedras and the
United States began, the embargo was suspended as the UN Security Council agreed
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on Resolution 948 and asked the OAS to do same.72
As reactions by the UN and the OAS were highly focused on embargoes and
sanctions, there were also doubts about the effectiveness of the economic pressure.
The concern was especially about the economic effects on low income populations
such as inflation and unemployment. Therefore, humanitarian concerns escalated as
poor communities suffered from the sanctions.73 For this reason, the UN and the OAS
agreed to create an International Civil Mission to Haiti OASAJN (MICIVIH) on May

Before beginning the aid, the two organizations had conflicting arguments on
defining humanitarian aid and whether discrimination of donors was acceptable.
Some, such as the OAS and Dante Caputo, the UNIOAS special envoy, were
distressed about the idea that the new regime in Haiti would misunderstand the
purpose of the aid. Unfortunately, because the member states had different political
interests, the UNJOAS Consolidated Humanitarian Plan for Haiti could only earn 19
percent of its aimed donation ($62.7 million).74
Despite the MICIVIH's obstacles in attracting funds and technical issues,
cooperation was successful with regard to the quick response in Haiti. For example,
while the UN was not able to deploy observers in Haiti soon enough, the OAS sent
observers in advance to rent offices and build infrastructure to deal with the
humanitarian issues. By 1994, the observer mission developed into supporting the
education system, human rights issues, election efforts, and judicial development.75
One of the missions the MICIVM requested was for the United Nations
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International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to protect child rights as a part
of the project. However, from the beginning, UNICEF faced challenges due to the
lack of knowledge about the region and the member states' political interests.
Especially, the sanctions that followed discouraged the team from dispersing
necessary goods and helping the most needy populations. Moreover the mission could
not facilitate more than as an observer in ~ a i t i The
. ~ ~Secretary Council's Sanctions
Committee-while

its effectiveness is controversial-eventually arranged a

humanitarian exemption. Later, recognition by the UNIOAS, the Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) supported with fuel
delivery to donating organizations in the region and management in a collective
effort.77
The joint mission by the UN and the OAS was one of the first cooperative
operations undertaken to defend democracy in Latin America. The mission is assessed
as a partial success due to the lack of appropriate support from the military. As
described earlier, the UNMIH force had to leave Haiti because of the domestic
opposition during the mission. However, the project was successful in that the
organizations set a precedent by committing an effort to consolidate democracy.
The result for the UN - OAS joint operation is somewhat controversial. This
is because the democracy level increased from -7 (1991) to -2 (2000) according to
the Polity score but there were severe fluctuations. The democracy level jumped to 7
in 1994, from -7 the previous year, which could be a result of the joint mission
observers' support in educational system, human rights, electoral, and judicial
development that began in 1994. However, the democracy level showed a big drop in
76
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2000 to -2 when tension grew in Haiti after the election. The Freedom House score
displayed similar results about Haiti. Both scores had 7 in 1991 but the political rights
score was able to only drop one point by 2000 while the civil rights score reached 5.
Although the result of Haiti case is controversial because of the fluctuation,
joint operations by the UN and OAS in Haiti increased the democracy level from an
authoritarian regime to a democracy during the period of 1991 and 1998. In Peru,
however, the OAS escalated democracy level from an anocratic regime to democracy.
In addition, while the OAS mission to Peru elevated the democracy level by
increasing its Polity score by 12 points, the joint OASIUN operation in Haiti advanced
the Policy score by 14 points.

VII.

Effectiveness of cooperation by international organizations

Joint operations can face challenges when the international organizations
have different decision making systems. The dilemma can escalate when the
organizations cannot agree on how to reach a goal. However, as seen in the Haitian
case, this opinion gap can increase discussions on how these organizations can better
support countries to reach democracy through consensus on methods and ultimate
goals. Aside from the politics, the UN Charter puts the main focus on people as the
main international actor. This idea brings the UN to promote democracy as the
organization believes that democracy consolidation can promote better living
standards for the people. Therefore, human rights become more important than
increasing specific states' interest on the region. In addition, although the current OAS
puts more emphasis on democracy consolidation, the organization was initiated to
protect human rights. This fundamental idea of the two organizations provides good
reason for them to cooperate in order to promote and help consolidate democracy.
Collaboration between the UN and the OAS can help the United States to
earn trust from the Latin Americans. Some of the Latin American countries still have
concerns about the United States' intention in intervening in their region. This is
because, so far, the region possesses a negative impression of the United States' past
intervention during the Cold War in the region while promoting its own democratic
The United States' commitments to democracy in Latin America were not
consistent and were dependent on the United States' interest. In some cases the United
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States would support non - democratic regimes or an action taken by certain groups
or individuals when it had critical links to the United States' security interest. In 1993,
the United States actively engaged to counter the autogolpe effort made by the
Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano. However, a year before in Peru the United States
did not counter President Alberto Fujimori's self - coup in 1 9 9 2 . ~Also,
~ the fact that
the United States has a large influence in the OAS deters the Latin Americans from
taking guidance on democracy consolidation because it questions the motives of the
United States.
The fact that the United States is a permanent member of the UN adds to
Latin America's concern on the effectiveness of the United States in the OAS. In
addition, the permanent council does not have a regional power from the Latin
American region to discuss the area's issues. However, as the importance of the UN
stands on its symbolic image that may empower the member states' behavior, the UN
Security Council can be an initiahve in beginning missions to the region and
announce the organization's support.80
Cooperation between the regional organizations and the world organizations
can be compared to collaboration between domestic actors such as the publ''C sectors
and local organizations. The relationship between these two actors can foster
facilitating knowledge and resources. Therefore, these actors may seek for assistance
simultaneously. On the one hand, the public organizations may request help from
local organizations, non - government organization or non - profit organizations or
civilian groups. On the other hand, local organizations may seek for relations with the
Weeks, Gregory. 2008. U.S. and Lotin American Relations. New York: Pearson Longrnan. 244
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international organizations to earn support in financial and material resources that
these local organizations may lack." Therefore, collaboration can support what other
organizations lack, such as in information, technical knowledge, resources, and other
possible assistance.
Scholar such as ~ e r e n s o n 'believe
~
that the OAS can be an active tool for the
joint organizations project when the UN cannot be situated at the site fast enough.
These differences lie under the different regulations and accessibilities these
organizations have. When a country faces a democracy backlash, the OAS can take an
immediate action through gathering an ad hoc meeting according to Resolution 1080.
However, the decision making process in the UN may take longer than the OAS due
to the interest distance between the participating countries. In addition, the OAS
members have easier geographical accessibility compared to a multinational force
from the UN. The joint mission to Haiti in the early 1990s is a good example of this.
Before the UN observers arrived at the site, the OAS sent its observers, approximately
100 observers, and prepared it with office and basic equipment. The UN, although it
anived late at the site, committed with its expertise in the issue.
The regional organizations and world organizations may have similar
functional factors in assisting countries. However, because they are different in size,
goals, and members that are affiliated in the system, their approach to the situations
may differ according to the organization type. For example, on the one hand, the OAS
focuses on strengthening and organizing national governments' legislature and
judiciaries. On the other hand, the UN puts emphasis on "decentralizing
Huxharn, Chris, Siv Vangen. 1996. Working Together Key Themes in the Management of
Relationships between Public and Non -Profit Organizations. The International Journal of Public
Sector management. Vol. 9 . 1
Berenson. 30

governance"83 and increasing civilian participation.84 In addition, during the
MICIVIH, the OAS and the UN had faced a contradiction in defining humanitarian
aid. Such challenges can be overcome through accumulated joint practice.
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VIII. Conclusion

Causes of democracy consolidation are discussed by various scholars in many
different ways. Scholars such as Lipset and Aristotle believe that economic
development will enhance the level of democracy. Nonetheless, there are others who
argue that the democracy level will decrease when a country reaches a certain level of
economic performance. Others who think that external factors can cause the
democracy level to increase put emphasis on international organizations to account
for democracy consolidation. Those who focus on using international organizations,
such as Pevehouse, usually favor regional organizations. They think the world
organizations' effectiveness in democracy consolidation is highly limited. They
believe that the regional organizations are more capable in implementing democracy
around the world and in Latin America. The power of regional organizations does not
only lie in their geographical concentration but also the pressure they can put on other
member states. This is because the regional organizations have smaller numbers of
member states, and it is relatively efficient for thc group to act through consensus.
On the other hand, the world organization can be an adequate tool when a
country wants to earn a reputation because there are more members that can recognize
others. Therefore, although a consensus is usually difficult to meet, when it is agreed
by the member states, the impact is much larger than that of the regional organizations.
The regional organizations and world organizations may have relatively
strong factors toward each other such as pressuring other states to act or to recognize
them certain way. However, each organization can also be supported in what they lack

in these characteristics. In 1995, the UN recognized the effectiveness of the OAS.
Therefore, the UN Secretary General included in Resolution 975 how the OAS can be
supportive to the UN to secure democracy in Haiti.
The cooperation between the organizations does not need to be bound by
symbolic meaning that the joint mission can give to the international society. They
can support each other through regulations and materials that each alone may lack.
Therefore, a joint mission between the regional organizations and the world
organizations can embrace better results than working alone. For example, on the one
hand, during the mission to Haiti in 1991, the OAS was able to declare a Resolution
before the UN could and condemn the military coup d'itat. The UN later announced
its concern of the issue and joined the OAS by sanctioning the new regime. On the
other hand, the OAS was assisted with the expertise and materials from the UN during
the observer mission.
There is a possibility that the separate mission to Haiti in 1991 could have
eased the tension, bring the military regime down, and restored democracy. Also, the
joint mission faced challenges because whenever a new decision was to be made, each
organization had to adopt a new resolution of its own. However, as a joint miss:on, the
UN and the OAS showed its collective and consistent support to restore democracy in
Haiti and urged member states to participate in the sanctions and embargo. This
coinciding joint action against the rough regime encouraged member states to
participate and resulted in restoring Haiti to its pre - condition before the coup d'Ctat.
The importance of cooperative action between the regional organizations and
the world organizations should not be minimized. The OAS and the UN recognize
their importance and have begun to hold forums to share information regarding this

matter. In addition, the case studies showed that the Haiti mission was more
successful in elevating the democracy level than the other two cases (Peru and
Guatemala). This result supports the argument that joint operations can be efficient in
implementing democracy consolidation. However, the joint operation failed to
maintain democracy in Haiti when stability eroded in 2000.
Therefore, a further challenge to this paper and to the cooperative form of
international organizations is to discover what necessary conditions or processes are
required for these joint operations to be most effectively implemented. Further, one
might test whether the short stability in Haiti was due to the domestic conditions or to
the limitations of joint operations. This can be researched from past joint practices by
not only the OAS and the UN but other world organizations and regional
organizations such as the European Union.
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